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Liability in Guest-Owner Cases
This article is to be strictly confined to cases in which
the guest' in an automobile sues the owner thereof, herein

known as "guest-owner" cases; and not cases in which the
guest sues some third party involved in an accident, through
which the guest sustained damages.

The distinction between these two types of cases must
be clearly borne in mind in studying cases in which the
guest sues, as the law, as applied, is far different. It seems

as if the courts are extremely reluctant in permitting a
guest'to recover from a third party, as so many exceptions
have been made to the general rule, such as contributory
negligence, imputed negligence, master and servant, principal and agent, common purpose, joint enterprise, testing
the danger; and to these general exceptions many divisions
and subdivisions have been made ;2 but are more generous
in guest-owner cases as there is but one exception. The

only apparent reason for this divergence is that in almost
all guest-owner cases the owner is protected by insurance,
and the maxim: "Let the insurance company pay" apparently is followed.
"Aguest is one who, with the knowledge of the owner, is in the
owner's automobile. The guest may be expressly invited and urged
by the owner (297 Pa. 458) or invited by implication, as in a taxicab
(92 Pa. Super. Ct. 356) or be a passenger without an invitation (75
Pa. Super. Ct. 333; 300 Pa. 225) or request the owner to permit him,
the guest, to ride (297 Pa. 30).
If a person is in an automobile without the owner's knowledge,
then he is not a guest, such as where the driver, not within the scope
of his authority, asks or permits a person to ride (285 Pa. 72; 291
Pa. 588; 297 Pa. 86).
2See 290 Pa.
288; 298 Pa. 352, for lists of cases on some of these
exceptions.
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In guest-owner cases the general rule is: If the owner
does not use due, reasonable and ordinary care under the
circumstances for the safety of the guest, then he is liable.3
To this general rule the first exception made was contributory negligence on the part of the guest.
One of the earliest Pennsylvania cases on this subject
is Cody v. Venzie, 263 Pa. 541. On page 548 Justice Simpson
states the rule and exception as follows:
"If upon the whole case the jury should find that defendant was guilty of a want of ordinary care, to which
the plaintiff did not contribute, they should find a verdict for the plaintiff; otherwise they should find a
verdict for the defendant."
In the next case in point of time, Vespe v. Rosen, 75 Pa.
Superior Ct. 332, the only point involved was whether the
host was negligent. No question as to contributory negligence was raised.
The case of Ferrell v. Solski, 278 Pa. 565, was decided
solely on the point whether the host was negligent. The
host raised the question of contributory negligence, and
in referring to it the Court, on page 570, stated:
"This conclusion makes unnecessary an extended consideration of the second question raised. Appellant
insisted deceased was guilty of contributory negligence,
which prevents recovery. He was a guest to whom, as
already noticed, the exercise of ordinary care was
owed; Cody v. Venzie, supra. It was his duty to avoid
apparent perils, and, if reasonably possible, hinder the
attempted commission of negligent acts, carrying with
them the likelihood of injury, if a recovery was to be
had: Renner v. Tone, 273 Pa. 10; Martin v. P. R. R. Co,"
265 Pa. 282. In the present case, Ferrell was on the
rear seat, and traveling at the same speed as maintained
throughout the trip. The accident occurred from inability to quickly straighten the car, after the desCitations need not be made as in all of the cases herein dealt
with, the general rule is set forth.
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pression was encountered. No effective protest could
then have been made by him, and it cannot, therefore,
be fairly said the deceased invited the harm by not
giving some warning to the driver. At least this was
a question for the jury, under the circumstances, and it
found for the plaintiff."
It should be noted that the guest in this case sat in
the back seat of the automobile.
The general rule, without the exception of contributory
negligence, was applied in the case of Simpson v. Jones, 284
Pa. 596. In deciding whether the host was negligent the
theory of unavoidable accident was applied, as it had been
in Ferrellv. Solski, supra.
In the case of Wagenbauer v. Schwinn, 285 Pa. 128, the
verdict was in favor of the owner. On appeal the Court,
desiring to sustain a verdict, held that the guest, who sat
in the front seat, "concurred in any negligent act of his
host" (page 131) but not feeling certain of its position,
undoubtedly due to the peculiar facts in the case, immediately added that the condition of the road may have been
the immediate factor, and not the speed at which the host
was driving.
The question of a guest being the servant of an owner
was introduced in the case of Campagna v. Ziskind, 287 Pa.
403. In this case the servant was a guest of the owner and
was riding in the owner's automobile. The Court did not
consider the rule under discussion, but dwelt upon the question of whether a suit at common law could be maintained.
The Court held that as the guest was a servant of the
owner, his remedy was under the Workmen's Compensation
Act, and not at common law.
In the case of Schomaker v.'Havey, 291 Pa. 30, the guest
was standing on the runningboard of the automobile. The
Court applied the exception of contributory negligence but
based its conclusion upon cases in which people stood in
dangerous places.
The general rule was reiterated as dicta in the case of
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Conroy v. Commercial Casualty Insurance Co., 292 Pa. 219,
228.
In the case of Brown v. Cunningham Cab Company, 92
Pa. Superior Ct. 356, the general rule, without any exceptions, was applied.
The exception of contributory negligence to the general rule was discussed in the case of Moquin v. Mervine,
297 Pa. 79. In that case the host, who was the appellant,
advanced the exception and the Court considered it but
declared that the guest was not contributorily negligent.
In the case of Lloyd v. Noakes, 96 Pa. Superior Ct. 164,
the Court distinctly recognized the exception of contributory negligence to the general rule.
From the foregoing cases we can assume that the only
exception advanced to that date to the general rule, was
contributory negligence, and in determining whether the
guest contributed to the negligence, we must consider only
guest-owner cases and dare not consider guest-third party
cases.
In the case of Lloyd v. Noakes, supra, decided April 10th,
1929, the Superior Court intimates that another exception
to the general rule exists, namely, common purpose, or
otherwise known as joint enterprise. At page 167 the
Court states:
"As the parties were not engaged in a joint enterprise * * * * the negligence of the driver is not im-

putable to the plaintiff";
thus leaving one to surmise that if the parties had been
engaged in a common purpose, negligence of the owner
could be imputed to the guest. This intimation was based
upon guest-third party cases.
Very shortly after the Lloyd-Noakes case, namely, on
May 27th, 1929, the theory of common purpose in guestowner cases was argued before the Supreme Court, in the
case of Hilton v. Blose, 297 Pa. 458. It is evident from a
reading of this case that the Court in its opinion filed July
1st, 1929, did not know what position to take-whether to
state that common purpose did or did not apply; and con-
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cluded to hold the matter in abeyance by deciding upon the
facts. The uncertainty of the Court is shown by the statement on pages 460-461:
"It appears that both plaintiff and defendant were interested in the pastime of bowling, and on the evening
in question were going to a common destination to
play this game; but they were not to engage in the
same game nor were they on the same team. While
they had a similar purpose in view in making the tripthat is, to bowl-yet their purpose was not a common
one, since they were to play in different teams and
bowl in different games."
This hair-fine and minute distinction that there was no
common purpose, is difficult to understand, especially when
one reads the case of Martin v. Penna. R. R. Co., 265 Pa. 282.
In that case the owner and guest had gone to a ball game
and on the return therefrom the accident occurred. A third
party was sued. Without discussion the Court immediately
stated that there was a common purpose. The only reasonable conclusion is that the Court believed that the guest
should recover in a suit against the owner and not against
the Pennsylvania Railroad Company. The Hilton case left
the question as to whether the exception of common purpose applied to the guest-host cases, in a far worse position
than before. The Common Pleas judges were in a quandry,
and in deciding cases on this subject most have resorted to
the maxim: "Let your conscience be your guide."
This uncertainty of position was not clarified by the
case of Cam pagna v. Lyles, 298 Pa. 352, decided November
25th, 1929, which was a guest-third party case. This case
contained dicta to the effect that in a guest-owner case,
if the parties were engaged in a joint enterprise, then the
guest could "not be considered as an invited guest with the
resulting limited liability for negligent acts of the driver".
(page 356) This conclusion was based solely upon the case
of Campagna v. Ziskind, supra. This dicta was not accorded
any great weight for the reason that in the Ziskind case the
sole question was whether or not suit could be brought at
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common law; second, that in the Ziskind case there was not
a single statement in the Opinion referring to or even intimating that a joint enterprise existed, and third, that in the
Lyles case it was pure dicta and in no way could be connected with the ratio descidendi. The profession and lower
courts were still in a quandry concerning the rule.
Fortunately Chief Justice Moschzisker, in a very able
opinion filed May 12th, 1930, definitely decided the point
in the case of Johnson v. Hetrick, 300 Pa. 225. On pages 231,
232 and 233 he stated:
"Even should the view be taken that plaintiffs' and
defendants' descendents were engaged in a joint enterprise at the time of the accident, if Johnson's (guest)
death was due to the negligence of Hetrick, (driver)
the latter would be liable in damages * * * * The controlling principle is simply that, be it a case of master
and servant,4 co-servants, principal and agent, or participants of any character in a common or joint enterprise, no person may negligently injure another without
being responsible for damages".
Citing from a Washington case, the Opinion, on page 233,
states:
"When the action is brought by one member of the
enterprise against another, there is no place to apply
the doctrine of imputed negligence. To do so would
permit one guilty of negligence to take refuge behind
his wrong".
It can now be assumed that the common purpose theory
is not an exception to the general rule in guest-owner cases.
Thus we can conclude that a person in an automobile
with the knowledge of the owner, can recover damages
if the owner did not use due, reasonable and ordinary care
under the circumstances for the safety of that person, provided that that person did not contribute to the negligence.
Erie, Pa.
'See Campagna v. Ziskinot, supra.

ALBAN W. CURTZE

Apportionment oj Property and Indebtedness Under The School Code
White Township School Directors' Appeal, 300 Pa. 422
is the first appellate court decision on the above subject
since the School Code was enacted in 1911 and it may prove
to be the last one. Sec. 114 (P. L. 312) of the Code provides that the decision of the court upon exceptions to the
report of commissioners shall be final, "without any right
of appeal". Appellate review is accordingly confined to
questions of jurisdiction alone. "We may determine whether
the given act is properly within the scope of their power,
but the manner of its performance, or the propriety or
fairness of the conclusion, is not the subject of review."
The judgment of the court below was accordingly affirmed,
since the Code clearly confers jurisdiction upon the court
below to hear, consider and determine the questions involved.
The language of the Code gives little guidance to commissioners and lower courts and though the above case
was decided on the ground indicated, statements in the
opinion as to the effect of the Code upon the rules laid
down in decisions under prior laws are of importance. The
Court states that section 111 of the Code changed the prior
laws as to payments by one district to the other. The
earlier acts were the Acts of April llth, 1862, P. L. 471 and
of June 24th, 1895, P. L. 259. These acts made no provisions for compensation to a new or outgoing district for
an undue proportion of school properties left within the
bounds of the old district. These acts provided for compensation to the old district for any undue proportion of
school property located in the territory withdrawing but
made no provision for the reverse situation.
In Munhall Boro. School District v. Miffin Township
School District, 207 Pa. 638, it was held that the Act of 1895
contained no authority to decree a balance due to the outgoing district for an undue proportion of school property
remaining in the old district. It was suggested as a reason
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for this apparently one sided provision that the legislature
assumed that the withdrawing territory would so adjust
the line of division as to get its full share of school property. Justice Kephart cites this decision in the Munhall
Boro. case as an instance of the changes made in the prior
laws by the School Code.
The relevant provisions of the Code are contained in
sections 110, 111 and 112. Section 110 provides that when
the land of a school district is divided between two or more
districts or where land is taken from one district and added
to another or where a new district is carved out of one
or more old districts, then a "just and proper adjustment and
apportionment of all school property, real and personal, in-

cluding funds, as well as indebtedness, if any, shall be made
to and among such school districts".
Section ill provides that in making such adjustment'
of the amount payable by one district to another and in
the apportionment of indebtedness there shall be "taken
into consideration" the amount and assessed value of the
annexed territory and of the other land "in the districts"
as well as the value of all school property "in such districts".
During the first school year after the change of boundaries the adjustment may be made by the boards of school
directors of the school districts concerned.
Section 112 provides that if the directors cannot make
the adjustment within the time stated, the Court of Common Pleas shall, upon petition, appoint "three disinterested
commissioners, residents and tax payers of the county,"
not residents of the affected districts, who, after a hearing,
shall report an apportionment "of all school property, as well
as indebtedness", among the districts affected, stating the
amount payable from one to another and the amount of indebtedness, if any, be assumed by the annexing district.
The Code could not be clearer in requiring an apportionment of property as well as of indebtedness. By express terms it repeals the Acts of 1862 and 1895. But the
desire of the courts to lean upon precedents has led to some
decisions which appear to ignore the plain language of
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the Code.
The Act of June 1st, 1887, P. L. 285, provided that
when a borough annexed adjacent land, the court should
appoint an auditor to report inter alia the liabilities of the
school districts affected and to adjust these together with
the value of the property held or acquired, "justly and
equitably". This act authorized decreeing a balance due to
the outgoing territory for an undue proportion of school
property remaining in the old district. See Darby Borough
School District'sAppeal, 160 Pa. 79, and Sugar Notch Borough,
192 Pa. 349.
The Code merely provides that the adjustment shall be
"just and proper" and that two things shall be taken into
consideration, first, the proportion of the assessed value of
the lost territory to that of the whole district from which
it is taken, and second, the vatue of school property in the
detached and remaining territory.
Justice Kephart states that the Code makes no change
in the reasons justifying a decree requiring a payment from
one district to another and this is true, since a district receiving less than its fair proportion of the school property
in a divided district always had a good reason for asking
that the inequality be adjusted by a proportionate assumption of indebtedness or by a money payment, when this was
necessary to equalize the adjustment.
He further states that the Code is not to be construed
as laying down a list of the exclusive factors to be considered in making an adjustment between districts. Assessed values are not to be final. Values may be otherwise
shown. Nor is it a mere problem in proportion, since this
may not produce a "just and proper adjustment." The commissioners, under the direction of the court of common
pleas, must take testimony as to all factors which may
"enlighten the question". The court may take additional
testimony to aid it in disposing of exceptions or may refer
the matter back to the commissioners to do so and to amend
their report in the light of the new testimony. There is
"no limit on the scope of the investigation," but the judgment of the court below is. "short of fraud", final.
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In Petition of Miffin Twp. School District,71 P. L. 1. 227,
Judge Shafer remarked that the Code sets up a proceeding
entirely different from those which were provided by the
former acts and seems to intend to provide for a sort of
equitable arbitration upon a "'general survey of the affairs of
each of the districts" affected, and so the amount be determined which "either district should pay to the other." He
recommitted the case to the commissioners and instructed
them to take testimony as to the school property and indebtedness of the annexing school district, to ascertain what
burden its taxpayers were already bearing and to ascertain
whether the school population in each district would be
cared for by the existing school houses at the time of the
annexation or whether their distribution might have been
so disturbed by the annexation that new buildings might
be necessary in one of the districts. In short, equity requires a survey of the entire school situation in both districts, and of the burden of debt each bore before the change
and the effect upon this burden of any proposed decree.
The correctness of the result arrived at in some of
the reported cases decided under the Code may now be considered. The first decision is that of School Dist. of Miffin
Township, 65 P. L. J. 489, (1917), a case in which a
borough annexed adjacent territory in which there was
no school property. Judge Carpenter thought that the
value of school property was not to be taken into consideration in a case in which no such property was located in the
annexed territory. Even under the Act of 1895, which required that debt be apportioned in accordance with the proportion which the assessed value of the detached territory
bore to the assessed value of the whole, when it appeared
that the debt was the result of a new building in the old
district, the annexing district was not required to assume
any of this debt. (Re Cheswick.Boro. School District, 52
P. L. 1. 91). But in such cases there may be no debt and
much valuable school property may remain in the old district, for which property the taxpayers in the detached
territory have made proportionate payment. Why should
they not receive enough to equal their proportionate in-
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vestment in these properties at their present worth, cost
less depreciation?
In Sandy Township School District v. The Falls Creek
Borough School District, 10 D. & C. 817, there was no school
property in a portion of the township annexed to the borough. The commissioners reported money due the borough
on account of the school property left in the township. The
court on exceptions held that the borough must assume a
portion of the old district's debt and that this was to be
ascertained by the proportion of the assessed value of the
annexed territory to that of the whole district from which
it was taken. No allowance was made for the fact that the
residents in the detached territory were losing school facilities for which they had paid in part. They were required
to complete their share of full payment without a chance to
benefit from such payment. The court could not see in
the School Code an intention to change the rule laid down
in the Munhall Borough case, so followed it and the Mifflin
Twp. case in 65 P. L. J. 489. Of course these cases would
have been differently decided if the judges had had the
benefit of Justice Kephart's construction of the Code.
In the case of Patton Township School District, 67 P. L.
J. 521, a borough annexed part of the township in which
there was a school building. The Commissioners viewed
the school properties and appraised their values. They also
took testimony relative to these values and so determined
whether there had been an unequal division of the school
property. They found a balance due from the borough
and the court approved their findings.
In the White Township case the Commissioners found
that the detached territory had an assessed value of about
three-fourths of the whole but had within its bounds only
about forty per cent of the school property. They deducted
total debt from total assets of the old district and apportioned the net assets in proportion to the assessed valuation of the two sections of the divided district. Since the
section with the greater value had gotten the smaller share
in value of school property, they awarded to it $10,324.38
in cash and placed the entire debt on the section which had
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the bulk of the school property. The result so arrived at
placed a debt upon the township of over 18% of its assessed
valuation. On its behalf it was contended that only quick
assets should be charged against it not an undue proportion
of ground, buildings and equipment. It was also contended
that an indebtedness could not be placed upon the township
in excess of the 7% limit fixed in Article IX, section 8 of
the Constitution of Pennsylvania.
Judge McConnel pointed out that it was clear, under
the terms of the Act of 1862, that the new district could
be made to compensate the old for any undue proportion
of school property in the new district but that the act contained no provision for the reverse situation, so that only
quick assets and indebtedness were divided in proportion to
assessed valuations when the new district received less than
its share of school properties. (Citing Appeal of the School
District of Aleppo., 96 Pa.76 and Appeal of the School District
of Aliquippa, 172 Pa. 81). He further pointed out that the
act of 1895 made no change in this regard but that the
School Code of 1911 required a just apportionment of all
school property and that either one should be required
to pay the other for any undue proportion of school property located in it, and that the language of the Code was
entirely different from that contained in the earlier acts.
"The presumption is, then, that the words contained in the
School Code are to have a different, and not the same construction as the prior acts (Rich v. Keyser, 54 Pa. 86; Omit
v. Commonwealth, 21 Pa. 426, 433; Commonwealth v. Pedder,
208 Pa. 28.) In our opinion, therefore, under the School
Code the commissioners appointed by the Court have the
right to, and should consider whether there is an undue
proportion of the school property remaining in either district and that each should compensate the other for such
undue proportion of real estate, and in this respect the
School Code is an entire change from the procedure which
was authorized under the Acts of 1862 and 1895 and the
commissioners are authorized and empowered and required
to make a just and proper adjustment of the indebtedness
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and apportionment of the school property in the two districts."
He further points out that in the Patton Township
School District case in 67 P. L.1., 521, the commissioners
figured the proportions of the real estate in the divided
sections and that the same was done in the case of Sugar
Notch Borough, 192 Pa. 349, a case decided under the Act
of 1887, which was like the School Code in that it required
a "just and equitable adjustment." in that case $6,169.74
was awarded to the new school district to equalize the
greater value of school property which remained in the
other territory.
But he decided, as did the Supreme Court in affirming
his judgment, that the adjustment is not a matter of mere
mathematical calculation based on relative assessed valuations of real estate and the commissioners' appraisal of
school property but that the matter is to be determined by
no fixed rulebut rather by the equities of the entire situation. He accordingly was induced by the consideration of
the very heavy debt the award of the Commissioners placed
upon the township to make a reduction in the amount of
the award so as to bring it down to the 7% limit fixed
by the Constitution. The costs of the proceeding were
divided in the proportion of the assessed valuations of the
two sections of the old district.
Taxes are paid on assessed valuations. School property
is acquired only from taxes and borrowed money to be repaid from taxes. The propriety of apportioning all school
property in proportion to assessed valuations of the divided
sections is obvious and only such extraordinary conditions
as resulted in the White Township case should be permitted
to outweigh the equity arising from contribution to the
cost of the property. Equitable power should not become
an arbitrary power to take from one and give to another
merely because that other might be more in need.
Carlisle, Penna.
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